1. What is it to trust in one's own trustworthiness? Aceording to Lehrer (1989, p. 143) , it is to accept the proposition expressed by:
T: 1 am a trustworthy evaluator of truth.
At another plaee (1990, p. 122 ), Lehrer offers a somewhat different formulation, viz.: "Whatever 1 aeeept with the objective of aceepting something just in ease it is true, 1 aecept in a trustworthy manner". It is safe to assume that the two formulations are alternative ways of expressing the same proposition. 1 mention the latter formulation because it may help to c1arify the former. Some more c1arfication as to exactly what proposition is expressed by T may eventually be required. But for the time being 1 will not engage in further analysis of the meaning of T. Instead, 1 wish to discuss the role T is supposed to play within Lehrer's epistemology.l Lehrer assigns a very special epistemic role to T; a role not shared by any other proposition: "The consequence of adding principle (T) to my acceptance system is that whatever I accept is more reasonable for me to accept than its denial" (1990, p. 122; cf. 1989, p. 143) . In making this claim about the role of T, Lehrer proposes what is, in effect, a substantial epistemic principle. He does not give the principle a name of its own nor does he highlight it by making it stand out from the surrounding text. But it certainly deserves to be singled out in this manner. So let us call it principle (R). Within the framework of Lehrer 's epistemology, (R) has to be expressed in the following way:
For any p, if S accepts T and S accepts p, then it is more reasonable for S to accept p than to accept the denial of p on the basis of S's acceptance system. Lehrer (1989, pp. 143f.; 1990, pp. 122f .) emphasizes one particularly interesting instance of (R); an instance which he does single out as an "official" principle (1989, p. 144):
(TR) If S accepts T, then it is more reasonable for S to accept T than to accept the denial of T on the basis of S's acceptance system.
Principle (TR) is of course intriguing. It invites one to think about circularity, epistemic regress and the question whether the coherentist Lehrer takes T to be "basic" in the sense usually associated with foundationalism.
2 Even though principle (TR) would certainly make sed by T. Since T contains the indexical 'I', T will express different propositions fordifferent subjects. I will avoid this complication by takingthe phrase' S accepts T' to mean 'S accepts the proposition expressed by T for S', or equivalently, 'S accepts that he/she is a trustworthy evaluator of truth'. 2. Lehrer discusses these issucs. In (1989, pp. 145f.) he argues that, insofar as (TR) is circular or regressive, the circularity or regressiveness involved is not epistemically vicious. In (1990, pp. 123f.) he points out that (TR) does not imply that T is basic in the sense required for traditional foundationalism. That is, (TR) does not imply that T justifies itself. The epistcmic status that T confers on itself, according to (TR) , is lower than the status required for justification.
